Is the Coal Network Capacity Company ‘independent’?

I recently bought Aurizon shares so that I could attend their 2023 AGM to raise the issue of ‘prudential concern’ for the development of new coal haulage infrastructure to support new coal mines in the Galilee Basin. At the AGM, 12 October 2023 I outlined my submission to the Review of the appointment of the independent expert and asked the Aurizon board to indicate the Adani entities with which it has made access agreements. They were not prepared to provide me with an answer citing commercial in confidence arrangements.

The Queensland Competition Authority announced their decision on 21 September 2023 finding that the Coal Network Capacity Company (CNCC) was ‘independent’.

My submission was redacted to remove the names of the former Aurizon staff on the CNCC leadership team. I’ve copied my original submission into this blog post without the redactions. The former Aurizon staff continue to be employed by the CNCC according to their LinkedIn accounts at the time of writing.

Re: Review of the appointment of the independent expert – Coal Network Capacity Company

I offer this submission as a citizen and as a resident of Queensland exercising my fiduciary responsibility. As a researcher, writer and activist I have developed extensive knowledge of the Galilee Basin coal complex and the Carmichael Rail Network in order to understand and communicate the means of export for Galilee Basin coal. My interest is in growing a better understanding of the political economy of export coal development in Queensland to expand the public discourse.

My interest with regard to the Coal Network Capacity Company (CNCC) is the exercise of prudential concern and responsibility for the expansion of coal production and transport from the Galilee Basin via the Carmichael Rail Network and the Aurizon-Newlands system.

The Queensland Competition Authority Act constrains the Queensland Competition Authority (QCA) from exercising prudential concern or engaging in oversight for new, significant coal transport infrastructure. The QCA Act does not ensure the QCA recieves copies of new access agreements made by/with regulated or unregulated entities. The QCA’s limited oversight can result in paucity of information available on the public record. Parties to access agrements can work in secret until a regulatory dispute needs to be resolved. Evidence of forseeable demand can be constrained making it more difficult for the QCA to make a compelling case to the Queensland Treasurer to provide specific directions.

The CNCC are not constrained in their freedom to consider future demand via the CRN and Aurizon-Newlands system, indeed it is clearly within their perview.

The QCA should consider the employment history of the CNCC leadership team when considering its ‘independence’ as experts for the purposes of the Review of the appointment of the independent expert.

Miranda Matthews – General Manager – Commercial Services and Vasu Chhabra – Senior Simulation Specialist are both former Aurizon employees. While past employment with Aurizon may not constitute an ‘interest or duty’ that may conflict with a CNCC expert’s functions as an independent expert, it is important to be mindful that former Aurizon employees may possess knowledge that is subject to contractual limits on disclosure, but valuable when an individual is appointed to a particular role.

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